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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

******************************
FASHION FOUR CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation and
ELGIN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Respondent~

Case No.

18164

vs.
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES,
a limited partnership,
and BOB GARWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.)
)

******************************
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

******************************
NATURE OF THE CASE
An action for forceable entry and detainer by Fashion
Four Corporation and Elgin Williams, as Lessee (Respondents
herein), against Fashion Place Associates, as Lessor (Appellant
herein), pursuant to the provisions of Title 78-36-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court found that the "locking out" of the
Plaintiffs from the leased premises by Fashion Place Associates
constituted forceable entry and detainer in violation of Title
78-36-2, U.C.A. 1953 as amended and awarded Plaintiffs money
damages, attorney's fees and a permanent injunction restraining
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Defendant, Fashion Place Associates from interfering with
Plaintiffs peaceable possession and occupancy of the leased
premises in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
Lease Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents, Fashion Four Corporation and Elgin Williams
(Plaintiffs below) ask the Court to dismiss the appeal and
affirm the judgment of the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 6, 1974, Fashion Four Corporation and
Elgin Williams, the Plaintiff-Respondents (hereinafter Fashion
Four) entered into a Lease Agreement (hereinafter Lease Agreement)
with Defendant-Appellant, Fashion Place Associates,

(hereinafter

Fashion Place) of certain premises located at the Fashion Place
Mall in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
No. 1)

(T. 27)

(R. 8) (Findings

From May 6, 1974 to June 11, 1981, transfers of this

Lease Agreement were made, concluding with an assignment back
to Fashion Four on June 11, 1981.

Eight days later, on or about

June 19, 1981, without any statutory formality or compliance,
Fashion Place, through its assistant manager, Bob Garwooq, locked
the premises and thereby locked Fashion Four out from their
actual and peaceable possession.
17)

(T. 43)

(Findings, No. 11, 13,

(Conclusions No. 4, 5)
Specifically, the above referred transfers occured

chronologically as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Charley's", a women's ready to wear business, which had
been operated in conformance with the Lease Agreement from the
outset by Fashion Four, was sold by Fashion Four, by written
Agreement, to Norsal Development Corporation (hereinafter Norsal)
during September, 1978 (T. 4,28)

(Findings No. 3)

this sale, Fashion Four assigned the Lease

Concurrent with

Agre~ment

to Norsal,

subject to Fashion Place's written consent to said assignment.
(T. 30)

(Findings No. 4)

Fashion Place never did give written

consent to this assignment,

(T. 30-32)

(R. 20)

(Findings No. 7)

(Conclusions No. 3) but has throughout this action admitted that
consent to the assignment had been given.

(T. 149) (Findings No. 9)

Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Lease Agreement reads:
"If the" tenant hereunder is a corporation ... the transfer, assignment or
hypothecation of any stock or interest
in such corporation ... in the aggregate
in excess of twenty-five percent (25%)
shall be deemed an assignment within
the meaning of Article 15." (R. 20)
Norsal entered into possession of the subject premises
and operated "Charley's" to June 11, 1981.

(T. 35-38,86-87)

During the third quarter of 1979 shareholders of Norsal, including Hugh Gardner, transferred all of Norsal stock, being more
than 25% of same to Neil Davidson, previously a small shareholder.
This transfer was consununated in November, 1979.
(Findings, No. 6)

(T. 91-93)

There was no assignment or consent for assign-

ment by Fashion Place of the Lease Agreement pursuant to this
transfer, as defined by Article 15 of the Lease Agreement.
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At trial, Fashion Place argued that they had no knowledge
of this stock transfer.

Yet, Fashion Place's attorney, Raymond

Berry, admitted that he examined a file as early as August, 1980,
that indicated Neil Davidson (hereinafter Davidson) was operating
"Charley's".

(T. 109)

Further, law suits for back rent were

brought by Fashion Place against Norsal Development Corporation,
Neil Davidson as an individual dba "Charley's", and qthers,
including the suit of C 80-7830, noted in Findings of Fact No.
21.

(R. 203) Finally, Davidson was not involved in "Charley's"

operation

un~il

November, 1979.

Up to that time Norsal operated

"Charley's" with a manager by the name of Nancy Love under the
direction of Hugh Gardner.

(T. 208)

It was only after November,

1979 that Davidson paid Fashion Place the rent for "Charley's".
(T. 34, 11-20)

(T. 208, 2-12)

(Findings No. 8)

Fashion Place

accepted rents from Norsal and Davidson and recognized Norsal
and Davidson to be the tenant in possession under the Lease.
(T. 38-39, 41)

In October, 1980, one (1) year after Davidson

acquired the stock ownership of Norsal, "Charley's", the sole
asset of Norsal, begain to experience financial difficulty.
Consequently, Norsal became delinquent in rents due to Fashion
Place and in payments due to Fashion Four under Agreement of
Sale between Fashion Four and Norsal.

(T. 100-103)

In mid April, 1981, Elgin Williams contacted Tom Estes,
the Mall manager, in regard to taking back the business of
"Charley's" by assignment.

(T. 3a,17)

(Findings No. 10,12)

It was Tom Estes response that the proposed use by Williams
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would be very complimentary to the mall, the only apparent problem
was the renegotiation of the Lease to a higher rent rate.
(T. 39, 19-25; T. 40,1-10)

In May, l981, Fashion Place wrote a

letter to Davidson offering to forgive all back rents if Davidson
would give up the space occupied by "Charley's".

(T. 41)

This

offer was never accepted by Davidson.
Negotiations between Davidson of Norsal and Williams of
Fashion Four
10, 1981.

con~inued

(T.42, 17)

until an agreement was reached on June
On June 11, 1981, Davidson, the principal

officer and sole stockholder of Norsal, assigned "Charley's"
and the Lease Agreement back to Fashion Four by executing a
Repossession Agreement (Exhibit 3) R. 149·) ap.d an Assignment
of Lease (Exhibit 4)

(R. 150) with Williams; Jan Nielson wit·'?

nessed the transaction and delivered the keys to Williams.
(T. 87, 20; T. 90, 7)

(Findings No. 12)

During that day, both

Davidson and Jan Nielsen told Tom Estes and Bob Garwood of the
business transfer and the re-assignment of the Lease Agreement
(T. 42-43)

(T. 87,20; T. 88, 15-17)

(T. 89, 96-98)

(T. 208)

No consent was given by Fashion Place for the above transaction.
Unfortunately, also on June 11, 1981, a Norsal judgment
creditor levied

ag~inst

the inventory and fixtures of "Charley's".

This delayed the opening of the store, but said attachment action
and the fact that negotiations had begun between the creditor and
Fashion Four to alleviate the debt were known by Fashion Place
that day.

(T. 46-48)

(Findings No. 15)

Davidson had talked with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the attorney handling the attachment into leaving the merchandise
and fixtures on the premises until Williams could make an arrangement for disposition on the same.

(T. 209) Williams finalized

the purchase of the merchandise and fixtures on or about August
1, 1981.

(T. 48; 58)
Fashion Four was in actual and proper possession from

June 11, 1981 until June 19, 1981 when Fashion Place perpetrated
forceable entry and detainer of said premises in violation of
78-36-2 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) against Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Fashion Four.

(T. 43)

(Findings No. 13)

(Conclusions Nos. 1,4,5)

Inspite of Fashion Four's demands for return of the premises
and attempts to tender all back rents on June 11th, 19th and
at later times, Fashion Place refused to restore said premises
until July 31, 1981 as ordered to do so by the Court, at which
time Fashion Four paid the rent.

(T. 44-48)

(Findings No. 13,22).

Fashion Place claimed the premises had been abandoned
pursuant to Title 78-36-12.3(3} U.C.A.
(T. 49; 120; 135)

(1953 as amended)

The claim of abandonment was an assumption

on the part of the Mall's assistant manager, Bob Garwood)

(T.156)

Notices were not served upon Fashion Four, Williams, Norsal or
Davidson pursuant to 78-36-8. 5 U .C .A.

( 1953 as amended) ·by

Fashion Place at the time of the "locking out".
No. 15)

(T. 50)

(Findings

(R. 202) Little, if any, evidence of abandonment was

presented at trial by Fashion Place.

(Findings No. 16)

(R. 202)

Trial was held on October 6th and 7th before the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, and the Court made its Minute Entry in favor of
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Plaintiff on October 23, 1981; after the parties had

~ub

mitted Memorandums at the request and direction of the lower
Court.

(R. 180)

The action of Fashion Four against Defendant,

Bob Garwood was dismissed on motion at the conclusion of the
case in that the Court determined that he was the agent of
Fashion Place Associates and had no personal liability.

(T. 213)

Fashion Four was awarded $3,500.00 in damages and $7,000.00
in attorney's fees and a permanent injunction prohibiting
Fashion Place from interfering with Fashion Four's possession
of the premises under the terms of the Lease.
of Fact, Conclusions of

Law~

(R. 207)

Findings

Judgment and Permanent Injunction

were duly entered by the Court on November 24, 1981.

(R. 198-209)

On November 25, 1981, Fashion Place properly moved for an
amendment of the Judgment, of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions nf Law and for a new trial.

(R. 211)

This

motion, after hearing, was denied by Court order on December
7, 1981.

(R. 215, 219)

Judge Banks, during the hearing on

the motion of Fashion Place for a new trial commented that he
had been conservative and restrictive in awarding damages to
Plaintiff and that the award of damages was low.

Fashion

Place did not file their Notice of Appeal for the present
matter until January 5, 1982.

(R. 222)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PURSUANT TO RULE 73(a) U.R.C.P. AND 78-36-11
U.C.A. 1953 AS .AMENDED, IN AN ACTION FOR
FORCEABLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, FAILURE TO
FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM
THE DATE OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER TO BE
APPEALED, FAILS TO GIVE THIS COURT JURISDICTION FOR REVIEW.
In Coombs v. Johnson, 484, P.2d 155 (Ut., 1971) this
Court very curtly denied review of a forceable detainer action
when it

beca.~e

apparent that 15 days had passed from the lower

Court's order to the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
In Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 338 (Ut., 1939) this
Court determined that review would be denied for an untimely
filing of the Notice of Appeal · under the shorter statutory period,
only if it was determined that the matter truly was an action
in unlawful detainer, rather than "one for a declaratory judgment construing a contract."
A.

THIS MATTER IS ONE OF FORCEABLE ENTRY
AND DETAINER.

The action brought by Fashion Four against Fashion Place
is for forceable entry and detainer, in that Fashion Place
"(4) ... entered and took possession and occupancy
(of the premises), and have locked out the
Plaintiff's from said premises ...
(5) ... contrary to the rights of Plaintiff pursuant
to said Lease Agreement, and the provisions of
78-36-2 ... " (R. 3)
Further, this matter was tried and adjudicated as an
action in forceable entry and detainer.

(Findings Nos. 1,3,13,

mart,¥

the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. FundingNos.
for digitization
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400

p.2d 507 (Ut. 1965)
Finally, although the facts of this case are involved,
they have been put forward to establish a simple fact pattern.
Fashion Four was in actual peaceable possession of the premises
for more than five (5) days before Fashion Place forceably
entered and detained said premises, in violation of 78-36-2

U.C.A.
Brandley's (supra) analysis at 339, determined that an
involved fact pattern did not necessarily mean the case is one
in declaratory judgment:
"To determine therefore whether Defendant was
in unlawful detainer the Court must determine
the meaning and eff~ct of the paragraph (of the
contract), but that does not change the action
from one in unlawful detainer.
It is merely
deciding a question, the decision of which is
necessary in makipg a determination as to whether
the Defendant is in unlawful detainer."
Similarly, the examination of the enforceability of
Article 15 here, does not transmute the character from being an
action in forceable entry and detainer; further, the preliminary
injunction requested and temporary restraining order was merely
enforcement of the forceable entry and detainer remedy and consistent therewith.

Anderson v. Granite School District, 413

P.2d 597 (Ut., 1966)
B.
78-36-11 U.C.A., 1953 AS AMENDED, PROVIDES
10 DAYS TO APPEAL DECISIONS IN FORCEABLE ENTRY
AND DETAINER."
Rule 73(a) of the U.R.C.P. states:
" ... the time within which an appeal may be
taken shall be one month from the date of the
entry in the Register of Actions of the judgment
or order appealed from unless a shorter time is
Sponsored by the"'-~~~-,-~_aw
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding"for digitization
provided byadded)
the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(emphasis
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-,-~~-~-~-.~7"\nr~

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

With respect to actions within Chapter 36 of Title 78,
including those pursuant to 78-36-2, 78-36-11 reads in its
entirety:
"Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered."
This has been interpreted by Coombs:
"The judgment was entered on July 1, 1970 and
the Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal from
that judgment on July 15, 1970.
It is apparent
that the appeal was not taken within the time
prescribed by Section 78-36-11 U.C.A. 1953,
and this Court is without jurisdiction to
entertain it." (emphasis added) Coombs, P. 155
Utah follows the rule of statutory interpretation expresse1
by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which
interpreted means that a statute that mandates a thing to be
done in a given manner and/or by certain entities shall not be
done in any other manner.·

Accordingly, the appeal of Fashion

Place should be dismissed and the lower Court decision should
stand affirmed on the grounds that Appellants filed an untimely
Notice of Appeal and this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain it.
POINT II
CONSENT OF LANDLORD, FASHION PLACE, FOR THE
REASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE FROM NORSAL-DAVIDSON
TO FASHION FOUR WAS NOT REQUIRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW
(Conclusion No. 2)
"As pointed out in Coulas v. Desimone 208 P.2d
105 (Wash, 1949), it has been held that such a
covenant is not broken where the assignment,
executed without the lessor's consent, is made
by the assignee back to the original lessee.
The reason therefore is stated in McCormick
v. Stowell, 138 Mass. 431 (Mass., 1885) as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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follows: '
by the Lease, itself, the lessor
consents to take the lessee as his tenant for
the full term mentioned in the lease.' "
(emphasis added)
Shoemaker v. Shaug, 490 P.2d 439, 442 (Wash., 1971)
See also Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 204,
212 (Alk. I 1980)
Good law, like truth and equity, stands the test of time.
McCormick, Coulas, Shoemaker and Hendrickson each had problems
that required solutions in fairness, in face of a lease forfeiture.
While only the first three cases involved an assignment back to
a prior tenant, they each found their solution in equity after
each Court considered the unfavored status of the lease-clause
which restrained alienation by contractual negotiation.
"although forfeitures for breach by assignment have been approved if authorized by
language in the Lease forfeitures are not
favored and never enforced in equity unless
the right is so clear as to permit no
denial.
Shoemaker v. Shag, 490 P.2d 439,
411 (Wash., 1971)" Hendrickson, 212.
"However, such covenants, being restraints
upon alienation by lessee, are not favored
in the law and are strictly construed."
Coulas, 110.
In Hendrickson, after the leased property changed ownership, Hendrickson, the new owner, gave written notice that the
lease would be strictly construed and specifically noted the
consent for assignment clause.

Six days later, the tenant in

possession assigned the lease, without consent, to a third person.
The Court had no choice but to forfeit the lease; strict compliance had been followed by the landlord and no equities favored
the third party tenant.
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However, McCormick, Coulos and Shoemaker each had nonconsented lease assignments back to a prior party of the lease.
When each of these parties entered the lease agreement, they did
so with the consent of the landlord for the duration of the lease.
Consequently, each of these Courts upheld the assignment and
the lease back to the respective prior tenant.
Appellant argues that the landlord should not be required
to predict the economic future of its tenants.

This is erroneous,

if there were such doubt, the lease term would be shorter.
Further, this is a red herring, as noted in dicta by Judge Jay
E. Banks, the real issue for Fashion Place withholding consent
is that, as Fashion Four claimed, lease

re~ts

had gone up.

The original lease calls for a rent-rate of $9.40 per square
foot per year, while on June 11, 1981 Fashion Place claimed the
market rate was $16.00 per square foot per year.

(T. 162, 17-21;

T. 40, 1-10; T. 161, 19-22; T. 162, 5-6)
The equities of the cases above speak directly to the
matter of financial loss.

Here, it is clear that withholding

consent would cost Fashion Four the benefit of their bargain,
their rent-rate, not to mention the loss of their leasehold
improvements; while in the alternative, Fashion Place would
lose nothing.
Fashion Place has a firm financial reason for breaking
the lease, the prospect of higher rents.

Clearly such a motivation

would do violence to Article 33 of the subject Lease Agreement,
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where the landlord is proscribed from unreasonably withholding
consent.

(R. 35)

Pursuant to the argument above, it is a matter

of law and equity that Fashion Four be allowed to re-enter the
premises without further consent from Fashion Place.

:The dee-

ision and judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed.
POINT III
FAILURE OF FASHION PLACE TO PERFORM IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 15 WAIVED ANY RIGHT OF FORFEITURE
FOR BREACH OF CONDITION AGAINST ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT
WRITTEN CONSENT.
It is undisputed that the subject Lease Agreement is
a very sophicated document, with its 31 pages, 35 Articles and
it.s 6 attached Exhibits, A through F.

Especially when one

considers the delineated procedures displayed in Article 15
which governs how written consent for lease assignments shall
be given.

(R. 20)
This procedure calls for written consent from the land-

lord to precede any assignment; secondly, it requires a writing
satisfactory to the landlord between assignor and assignee in
each instance; thirdly, it demands a written assumption of liability of the Lease Agreement by assignee, of Lessee's terms,
for the benefit of the landlord; and finally, it requires the
executed writing to be delivered to the landlord.
None of the assignors, nor any of the assignees to the
transfers noted in the Statement of Facts herein, could compel
Fashion Place to comply with the procedures of its own writing.
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When Fashion Four asked for consent, by Fashion Place's own
choice, they did not

pro~ide

Fashion Four or Norsal with a

written consent prior to the assignment.

Instead, Fashion Place

proffered a second document, by design, to be signed by Fashion
Four, Norsal and Fashion Place, contrary to the procedures of
Article 15.

Since this document was not signed by Norsal as

assignee or Fashion Place as the landlord it has no force or
effect.

(Conclusions No. 3)

Consequently, no written consent

exists for this assignment.
No consent, written or otherwise, nor any assignment
was made following the Norsal stock sale transfer to Davidson,
as defined by paragraph 3 of Article 15.

Nor was any objection

raised by Fashion Place when the transfer-sale became apparent.
Fashion Place knew a change of ownership had occurred,
as evidenced by their acceptance of rent from Hugh Gardner for
the first year of Norsal's possession, and from Neil Davidson
for the second year of Norsal's possession. (Findings No. 8)
A presumption is raised that the lease has been assigned, when a
person other than the prior tenant in possession begins to pay
rent.

Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp. 507 P.2d 713 (Ut., 1973)
Further, Fashion Place brought two (2) suits for back

rent collectively against the corporation, Norsal Development,
and the individual, Neil Davidson, dba "Charley's" (Findings
No. 21)
Finally, no notice was ever given other than the original
Lease Agreement of 1974, that Article 15 would be strictly enforcec
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"It is a well settled principle of law that
where a landlord has led the tenant to
believe that strict compliance of a covenant
will not be required, the landlord cannot
thereafter demand forfeiture of the lease
without first giving the tenant notice that
strict compliance of the lease will be
demanded in the future." Hendrickson,
211 n.6, See also Duncan v. Malcomb, 351
S.W. 2d 419 (Ark., 1961)
The lessor is responsible for his conduct and dealings
with his tenants and their assigns under the lease, especially
when the lessor is in conflict with the lease.

In Kinter v. Harr,

408 P.2d 487 (Manto, 1965), a tenant-assignee to a lease containing a "no assignment without consent" clause, was deemed
responsible for the lease, even though, no consent for the
assignment was ever given.

The Court said, at 496,

"That provision (the consent clause) is for the
benefit of the lessor and may be waived by
accepting rents from the assignee and permitting him to remain in possession."
See also Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co.,
182 P.2d 132, 187 (Ca., 1947); Sun World Corp.
v. Pennysavers, Inc., 637 P.2d 1088, 1092
(Ariz., 1981)
Appelrant puts forward two (2) cases against waiver.
Nashville Record Prod. v. Mr. Transmission, 623 S.W. 2d 281
(Tenn., 1981) and Warmack v. Merchant National Bank of Fort
Smith, 612

s.w.

2d 733 (Ark., 1981)

Nashville involves rental payments; its legal status
is not on the same plane as here, where alienation of property
transfers are at issue.

Warmack involves a controverted

assignment to an operation in direct competition with a present
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Mall tenant.

Its fact pattern and law are not comparable here.

The contract is a continuing relationship between the
parties, like the law it changes in accordance with the times,
as exhibited by the parties course of dealings.

Certainly, the

lease assigned to the assignee should be the same as the lease
the assignor operated under, including those terms modified or
waived by the landlord unless notice of strict compliance is
timely reiterated.
CONCLUSION
This case involves an unconsented re-assignment of a
lease back to the original tenant of the Lease Agreement, and the
subsequent forceable entry and detainer by the landlord.

The

first item to decide is whether Fashion Place, in locking out
Fashion Four, violated 78-36-2.

If this decision is in the

affirmative, procedurally this Court is without jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal due to the untimely filing of the Notice
of Appeal by Fashion Place pursuant to Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P. and
78-36-11.
An item not discussed above, was the claim of abandonment of the premises by Fashion Place as justifying its acts.
This position was factually unsupported at trial and the Court
properly concluded that there was no abandonment.
No. 8)

(Conclusions

Also see Kasson v. Stout, 507 P.2d 87 (Ca., 1973)
Appellant argues that the law of McCormick is archaic,

that the practice of preserving the lessor's consent for each
assignee of the lease for the duration of the lease, is out of
date.
Appellant
argues
that
itthe Institute
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when cited in Coulas.

Respondent disagrees.

The restriction

on assignment without the consent of Fashion Place ceased to
be operative under the facts and circumstances of this case
and the general principals of law cited.

Consent of Fashion

Place to the re-assignment of the lease from Norsal-Davidson
to Fashion Four as the original lessee was not required.
Good law, however old, withstands time.

The equities

of McCormick can be traced all the way to Hendrickson the 1980 ·
case from Alaska.

It is these equities that cry out against

Fashion Place's unreasonable withholding of their consent from
a prior tenant as leverage to raise rent, this case law must be
reiterated in this jurisdiction.
Lease forfeitures are unfavored in the law.
without strict compliance of the
lease.

leas~,

Typically,

equity will save the

The overall effect is that without the landlord's strict

compliance of the lease terms, as was not the case here, the
forfeiting clause is waived.

Accordingly, the decision and

judgment of the lower Court should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,

KHA SE

660 Sou h 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
534-1148
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